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This article gives us results of the work on ensuring protection of critical information, transmitted in 
automatic train signaling system (ALS), based on DMR-RUS radio channel (special version of Digital 
Mobile Radio for Russian railway), against computer attacks, targeted to modification and substitution 
of data. The purpose of this work is development of integrity monitoring and reliability verification 
system (IMRVS) for information, transmitted in ALS. There are different ways of building IMRVS. 
This article shows one of these methods, which, in authors’ opinion, is optimal for using in ALS. 
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1 Introduction 
Industrial control system (ICS) are widely used in the field of railway transport (RT). The application 
of ICS in RT allows solving such problems as planning and control of transportations, control and 
registration of the activity of enterprises and objects of railway sector and problems, related to the 
exploitation of railway infrastructure objects and their security [1]. 
The last class of problems, related to the exploitation of objects and their security, includes the 
problems of movement control of trains at stations and stages, control and diagnostics of locomotives, 
ensuring the security of trains’ movement, control of electric power supply of railway infrastructure 
objects and others. It’s necessary for the process of control of train’s movement at stations and stages 
and ensuring of their security to use automatic train signaling systems (ALS), which are systems of 
transmission to locomotive onboard devices of information about permitted speed of movement and 
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additional conditions of moving of railway rolling stock: speed limit, the route of moving at a railway 
station [2]. We will call the information transmitted with ALS critical information. 
The traditional ALS, which uses track circuits [2], has some disadvantages. They are limited 
reliability, small information capacity of data transmitted to locomotive, a bigger measure of 
discreteness of determination of the train location [3]. The use of ALS system based on radio channel 
(GSM-R, DMR-RUS, Wi-Fi) allows to increase the speed at the sections of the track and throughput of 
stages by decreasing the amount of coding failures, optimization of speed modes and intervals of 
following trains.  
Transition to the use of ALS based on radio channel leads to the appearance of a new class of security 
threats, associated with the disruption of transmitted data integrity by implementation of attacks on 
interception, modification and obtrusion of critical information when the perpetrator is far from the 
controlled zone (railway). The implementation of such attacks can lead to disturbance of train movement 
because of getting wrong critical information. At this moment ALS systems based on radio channel 
DMB-RUS don’t have protection mechanisms against such attacks.  
There is a contradiction – ALS systems based on radio channel DMR-RUS don’t have necessary 
security mechanisms for integrity monitoring and reliability verification of critical information and at 
this moment there is no existing data protection tool for such type of ALS systems, which can implement 
these functions. The solution of this contradiction can become possible by designing integrity 
monitoring and reliability verification system of critical information [4], transmitted between the station 
and locomotive according to DMR-RUS Standard. 
2 The description of DMR-RUS  
Protocol DMR-RUS was based on Digital Mobile Radio Standard (DMR) [5]. The process of 
information exchange there is based on technology of Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) and it 
consists of cycles of data transmission. Besides, information exchange is organized on the principle of 
“request-response”, i.e. base radio 
station sends the request and 
subscriber’s radio station replies 
it. Data transmission cycle 
consists of four frames, each frame 
has two time slots (Figure 1).  
The data B1 and B2 of base 
station are being transmitted in the 
first and in the second time slots of 
the first frame. The first timeslot of 
the second frame is used for 
registration of new subscribers of 
the net (packet R1) or for sending a request of immediate transmission of data from subscriber’s radio 
station. The second time slot of the second frame, the third and the fourth frames are used for 
transmitting data A1, A2, A3, A4, A5 of subscriber’s radio station. Each packet of data B1, B2, R1, A1-
A5 consists of 12 bytes. 
2.1 Survey and registration of subscribers  
Base radio station must make periodic survey and get data from registered subscribers. The 
periodicity of subscriber’s survey is 2.88 seconds or 12 cycles. And besides there can be surveyed up to 
12 subscriber’s stations. In case of a big amount of subscribers on the net, the period of surveys 
increases.  
 
Figure 1: The structure of data transmission cycle in DMR-RUS 
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To register a new 
subscriber’s station, it sends a 
request for registration in the first 
time slot of the second frame 
(Figure 2). When the request was 
got the base radio station must 
send in B2 packet the ID of 
registering subscriber’s radio 
station for its survey. Next in this 
cycle the registering subscriber’s 
station must answer base station by sending packets A1-A5 (Figure 2). After that the registration is 
thought to be finished and the base station must begin the periodic survey of registered subscriber’s 
radio station. 
3 The design of IMRVS 
Work model of ALS system based on DMR-RUS consists of two levels: application layer and data 
link layer. The exchange of critical information occurs at the application layer, or at the ALS layer, 
between the components of ALS system, installed at the station and at the locomotive. Data Link Layer, 
or radio station DMR-RUS layer, is responsible for critical information transfer between the base radio 
station, installed at a railway station, and subscriber’s, installed on board of locomotive.  
It is suggested for ensuring of integrity and reliability of transmitted information to develop 
additional layer of the model which would be located between the application and data link layers and 
which would provide the 
necessary level of 
protection (Figure 3). 
We’ll call the suggested 
level the level of security, 
or the level of integrity 
monitoring and reliability 
verification (IMRVS). It is 
proposed that hardware and 
software components of 
IMRVS, installed at the 
station and locomotive, 
will exchange specially 
formed verification 
information, which confirms that critical information was received from legitimate station or 
locomotive. 
The achievement of the task set before IMRVS can become possible by using digital signature or 
authentication codes (MAC, HMAC) as verification information [4]. Moreover, because of the ability 
to use developing IMRVS at railway sections, which have federal significance, the protection 
mechanisms (digital signature or authentication codes) must be developed according to Russian State 
Standards and must use Russian cryptographic methods of information protection [6-8]. 
 
Figure 3: The proposed model of transmission of critical information by 
DMR-RUS 
 
Figure 2: The scheme of subscriber’s radio station registration 
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3.1 The requirements to IMRVS 
During the designing of IMRVS it is necessary to consider functional requirements, imposed by the 
application layer, or ALS system, and also the limits of data link layer, associated with the particularities 
of DMR-RUS. These requirements and limits are: 
 
1. The limit of transfer time of critical information. The minimum amount of data, which is 
necessary for ALS system’s correct work, and relevant verification information must be 
transmitted by one period of survey (2.88 seconds).  
2. The limit of DMR-RUS radio channel capacity. The amount of data, which can be transmitted 
from base radio station to registered subscribers by one whole period of survey, is equal to 192 
bytes; from subscriber’s radio station to base radio station this value is equal to 52 bytes. 
3. The minimization of the amount of data security level. The amount of transmitted data of 
application layer by one period of survey depends on configuration of the station (the amount 
of ways, points, signals) and on the average is equal to 100 bytes during transferring from 
station to locomotive and 25 bytes in case of transferring data from locomotive to station. In 
this connection and considering the fact of possibility of further use of DMR-RUS radio 
channel not only in ALS system, the minimum size of verification information of security level 
is one of the main criteria during the development of IMRVS. 
4. Broadcasting mode of the base radio station. As the base radio station transmits data to 
registered subscribers in broadcasting mode, the common key of verification of digital 
signature or authentication code must be used for all registered at the base radio station at the 
current moment locomotives for integrity monitoring and reliability verification of messages.  
It should be noted that the problem of transferring the verification key to locomotive can be solved 
in three ways: 
 
x Verification keys of all stations’ messages are inserted into locomotives during the initial 
installation of IMRVS; 
x Verification key is being transmitted to locomotive immediately at the moment of its 
registration at this station by DMR-RUS radio channel; 
x Verification keys of stations’ messages are transmitted to locomotive before train departure 
with additional communication channel (GSM, Wi-Fi) or external storage. 
3.2 The proposed variant of building IMRVS  
During the development of IMRVS we considered 6 variants of its building. Different variants of 
building are possible because of the choice of type of message verification (use of digital signature or 
authentication codes) and the way of transferring verification keys of station’s messages to locomotive 
(The requirements to IMRVS). As a result of analysis of possible variants of building and fulfillment of 
the requirements described above, it is proposed to design IMRVS based on authentication codes with 
transmitting verification keys at the moment of locomotive’s registration. The proposed structure of 
IMRVS is shown at Figure 4. 
At the moment of registration the station transmits verification key Ks to locomotive. Next, the 
exchange of application layer data (ALD) between station and locomotive begins. The transmitted data 
is protected with the help of authentication codes (AC), generated on the key Ks. In case of mistake, 
ALS doesn’t use received data and keeps waiting for the next message (similarly as in case when data 
wasn’t delivered). 
 




The process of registration of locomotive at the station and transferring message verification key Ks 
are shown at Figure 5. Locomotive sends IDi of its key ܭ௅௜ with a random number R and AC for R on 
 
Figure 4: The proposed structure of IMRVS. AC is an authentication code; KS is a station key, which is 
used for generation and verification of AC; KL is a locomotive key, used for secure transfer of KS to locomotive; 
AT is an authenticity table, which contains all locomotive keys KL and which is stored at each station; ALD is 
application layer data; | means data concatenation; [ ]K means secure transfer with key K. 
 
Figure 5: The process of locomotive’s registration at the station and transfer of station key KS to 
locomotive.  AC is an authentication code; KS is a station key which is used for generation and verification of 
AC ; KLi is a locomotive key, used for secure transfer of KS to locomotive; AT is an authenticity table, which 
contains all locomotive keys KL and which is stored at each station; IDi is the identifier of the ключа KLi at 
the AT; R is a random number; RACKL is an AC for R; ALD is an application layer data; | means data 
concatenation; [DATA]K means DATA encryption with key K. 
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the keyܭ௅௜ . The station finds key ܭ௅௜ with received IDi at authenticity table AT and verifies the received 
AC. If verification is failed, the station notifies locomotive about the necessity of the repetition of 
registration procedure. If verification is successful, the station sends to locomotive key Ks, encrypted 
on locomotive key ܭ௅௜ , and adds generated with locomotive key AC to the end of the message. 
Locomotive verifies AC and in case of successful verification decrypts it and gets key Ks. After that the 
exchange of application layer data (critical information) begins. 
4 Conclusion 
As a result of this research, it is proposed to develop integrity monitoring and reliability verification 
system for transmitting critical information in ALS system, based on DMR-RUS radio channel. The 
relevance of such development can be explained by the lack of security mechanisms for such type of 
ALS systems. As a result of analysis of possible variants for building IMRVS and fulfillment of all 
requirements described above it was suggested to design IMRVS based on authentication codes with 
transmitting verification keys at the moment of locomotive’s registration. The structure of suggested 
IMRVS was shown and the secure way of verification key transmitting at the registration moment was 
described in this article. 
In future works it seems appropriate to develop final scheme of IMRVS, including key management, 
and to evaluate the possibility of the use of MAC or HMAC as authentication codes in IMRVS and to 
choose optimal variant. 
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